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Euthanasia: A Soft Paradigm 
for Medical Ethics 
Russell L. McIntyre, Th.D. 
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Doctor McIntyre spent a year at 
Harvard Medical School as a Ken-
nedy Fellow in Medical Ethics. He 
currently is director of Programs 
in the Health Care Humanities, 
College of Medicine and Dentistry 
of New Jersey . 
Ethics has always been one, if not the primary, concern of the 
medical practitioner. Every physician is familiar with the ancient Hip-
pocratic Oath and aware of the current "code of ethics" promulgated 
by the American Medical Association. Indeed, among the professions, 
physicians have continuously been ranked among the leaders in public 
trust with, unfortunately, politicians, businessmen and clergy ranking 
far below. Recent developments in biomedical research and medical 
therapeutics have begun to raise new and vitally serious questions 
regarding the appropriate use of medical information and therapy, and 
of adequate controls for biotechnical experimentation. 
Achievements in medicine and science in the past forty years have 
given man new power over acute and chronic disease, physical and 
mental debilitations, and the mechanical support of deteriorating 
bodily functions. With the discovery of anesthesia, antiobiotics, and 
insulin ; the techniques of surgical excision, and chemotherapy; and 
the technologies of life-support systems, have come new and difficult 
responsibilities. In an important way, medical science has been too 
successful too rapidly . Technologies have increased our capacity to 
overcome many human problems of disease and debilitation. But suc-
cess has come before we have adequately explored the potential 
abuses of the technology and before we have defined its appropriate 
and inappropriate uses. 
"Euthanasia" is both an ancient and modern controversy. It is one 
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of those morally loaded words which provokes both outrage and 
sympathy; it conjures up images of diabolical practices as well as 
feelings of mercy for the release from painful dying. 
The moral justifications for the arguments pro and con euthanasia 
were largely developed before modern technological therapeutics were 
discovered. The rapid development of medical technologies is now 
forcing a new ethical re-thinking on every aspect of life, especially the 
processes of birth and death. What is all too apparent today is that 
many ethicists, moralists, philosophers and theologians, are continuing 
the debate with the stale ammunition of pre-technologic notions. This 
is not to infer that these ideas are totally inappropriate but, rather, 
that serious re-thinking must be done to intensify the present debate. 
The term " euthanasia" combines two Greek words, meaning 
"good," and "death." The term does not mean that death is good. All 
it refers to is the condition under which a person passes from life into 
death. It is sometimes called a "merciful death" meaning that the 
person did not suffer long and hard before death occurred.l 
Discussion of euthanasia is usually classified according to the meth-
ods used to hasten or induce death and whether or not death is a 
self-chosen end. The terms most employed are: active or passive and 
voluntary or involuntary. Active euthanasia would refer to the direct 
administration of something for the express purpose of terminating a 
suffering and terminally ill patient's life. Examples would be a mega-
dose of morphine or a bubble of air in a strategic vein. Passive eutha-
nasia refers to two different types of actions: first, the failure to 
employ various medical therapies because it is believed that they 
would not serve to prolong life as much as they would serve to pro-
long death . Examples would be to withhold antibiotics in a terminally 
ill person with pneumonia; not connecting a person to a needed respi-
rator; deciding not to institute dialysis despite renal failure; or deciding 
not to give calories along with IV fluids for a comatose patient. The 
second type would be the withdrawal of a patient from life-sustaining 
medical technologies even though death is anticipated. An example of 
this second type of passive euthanasia would be to turn off a respirator. 
Voluntary euthanasia would refer to either active or passive meas-
ures performed at the behest of the patient. Involuntary euthanasia 
would refer to active or passive measures performed on a patient who 
cannot make his or her wishes known because of incompetency. An 
example would be someone in a "persistent vegetable state" (e.g., 
Karen Ann Quinlan). 
We must note that in each of these there are tremendously compli-
cated ethical issues. They become further compounded as we combine 
possibilities, such as active-involuntary euthanasia. 
The physician today is placed in a true moral dilemma. His mandate 
as a physician includes at least three major responsibilities: to protect, 
preserve, and promote life; to do no harm; and to alleviate suffering. 
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The dilemma presents itself when not all three can be achieved at the 
same time with the same patient. For example: does his mandate to 
preserve and protect life exist above all else? Does this mean that all 
life should be preserved as long as technically possible? If his patient is 
in intractable pain, does his mandate to alleviate suffering mean that 
he can administer increasing dosages of narcotics even though vital 
functions will be so depressed that they will eventually become life-
threatening? What is the content of his mandate to do no harm, 
primum non nocere? What is harm? Is it forcing a person to endure 
excruciating pain or is it to succumb to an earlier demise? Deciding for 
one alternative means the subjugation of the others. 
Selection of Certain Values 
Medicine is not now, nor has it ever been, a value-free enterprise. 
The practice of medicine is the selection of certain values of health as 
being normative for the society and the labeling of other non-norma-
tive values as deviancy or illness.2 Advances in medical technology are 
forcing us to re-think our basic moral positions. Are there circum-
stances which make life not worth living, in spite of the fact that 
biologically we can be mechanically sustained? Are there circum-
stances in which life should be terminated? Should patients who are 
suffering and dying be allowed to "die with dignity" by withdrawing 
or failing to employ life-sustaining procedures? Should their lives be 
taken by death-dealing narcotics? Should such steps be taken only at 
the request of the patient, or in consultation with his family and his 
doctor?3 The dilemma involves the prioritizing of specific values, such 
as the sanctity of life; the principle of least suffering; the concepts of 
human dignity, personal autonomy, and justice; the right to live; and 
the quality of the life that might be salvaged. 
In Western culture, Christianity once defined the meaning and order 
of these ethical principles. "With the secularization of our society, 
however, ethical values have become autonomous."4 There is no 
longer a common commitment to these basic values. And with no 
general commitment to values, we have no general expectation with 
regard to how medicine or society should answer this medical dilem-
ma. There exists today "a great deal of conceptual confusion asso-
ciated with our feelings about life and death."5 
I am going to suggest that euthanasia need not be the demon first 
supposed and that it even has a morally acceptable place in our con-
temporary understanding of patient care for the terminally ill. But I 
want to make it explicitly clear at the outset that I have what I believe 
to be reasonable and acceptable limits to the development of a policy 
of euthanasia. In the line-drawing will be the parameters for my "soft" 
paradigm. 
Our purpose is twofold: first, to encourage a new and healthy 
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debate on all aspects of the euthanasia issue without loading the 
"moral gun" before the debate begins, thus I will purposefully not use 
the term "killing" in my description because of its pejorative moral 
content;6 and, second, to set forth a process understanding of life and 
death that might more adequately inform today's pastoral concerns. 
Technology has brought us to the threshhold ofa new era in medi-
cal care. The old arguments for and against euthanasia cannot simply 
be transferred to the new debate without a serious re-examination of 
their moral presuppositions. Just as our understanding of when death 
occurs has been radically restudied and redefined in recent years,7 so 
also our understanding of the "process" of dying must be re-ex-
amined. Hopefully, this paper will be a start in that re-examination. 
A. The Ethical Argument: The Opposite Extremes 
1. The conservative, called the formalist or de ontological, position 
places absolute value on all forms of human life no matter how debili-
tated. Therefore, no person has the authority to terminate any human 
life. In opposition to any policy of euthanasia, this position stresses 
the sanctity of life per se, and claims that life always has value regard-
less of its qUality.8 This has traditionally been the position of the 
Roman Catholic Church which has claimed that we hold life as a gift 
from God in trust, and, therefore, only God can take life.9 And this is 
the position enshrined in the Catholic Hospital Association guideline 
which states that "Euthanasia in all its forms is prohibited. "10 
This was also the position of Albert Schweitzer as put forth in his 
famous "Reverence for Life" essay. He defended the position by say-
ing: 
"Objection is made to this ethic that it sets too high a value on natural life .... 
The ethic of reverence for life is found particularly strange because it enables 
no dividing line between higher and lower,' between more valuable and less 
valuable life. For this omission it had its reasons. To undertake to lay down 
universally valid distinctions of value between differing kinds of life will end in 
judging them by the greater or lesser distance at which they seem to stand from 
us as human beings - as we ourselves judge. But that is a purely subjective 
criterion. Who among us knows what significance any other kind of life has in 
itself, and as part of the universe. "11 
2. The liberal, called the utilitarian, position uses certain qualitative 
measures to determine the relative value of sustaining a life when seen 
against the backdrop of competing values. This position holds that 
biological life is not an end in itself, but only a means to other ends, 
namely productive human activities. One of the most extreme exam-
ples would be a statement by ethicist David H. Smith in which he said 
that he does not consider every product of the human wom b a per-
son. 12 Another example would be the so-called "indicators of human-
hood" of Joseph Fletcher. He lists twenty criteria for establishing 
human personhood. Among these are self-awareness, self-control, a 
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sense of time (past and future), the capability to relate to others, 
curiosity, and minimal intelligence. With regard to minimal intelli-
gence he writes, " ... any individual ... who falls below the LQ. 
40-Mark ... is questionably a person; below the 20-Mark, not a per-
son. "13 Mongoloids, mental defectives, irretrievably comatose pa-
tients, all would fail his qualitative measurements and thus be fit 
candidates for euthanasia. 14 
B. Ethical Presuppositions 
1. The conservative position is based upon three major ethical con-
siderations: the principle of the sanctity of life; a theory of natural 
law, which includes natural , or prima facie, obligations; and the 
"wedge" argument. 
a. The sanctity of life principle is claimed to be inherent in the 
human experience. All people are aware of, at least, the value of their 
own lives. Theologically understood, life is a gift of a loving God. It is 
simply given with no prior considerations as to management potential 
or worthiness. It is given to man as a sacred trust to be protected and 
revered. It is, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, created in the image of 
God. This gives man a "right to life" which is grounded in his divine 
origin. This right to life is claimed to be "the basis of all other human 
rights and is the foundation of civilized society." 15 This primary val-
uation of life is also reflected in the second principle: 
b. The theory of natural law is said to be revealed in the natural 
process, and intuitively known to all men through the powers of 
human rationality.16 Natural law theory asserts that man universally 
has a prima facie obligation to do good (positive natural law) and to 
avoid evil (negative natural law). Positive natural law prescribes that 
certain moral acts be done because they are intrinsically good. Man 
has a primary obligation to do good. Negative natural law, on the 
other hand, proscribes certain actions which are intrinsically evil and 
actions which are evil because of the attending circumstances. 19 
Therefore, man has the primary duty to avoid evil - and there are no 
exceptions. 18 
A problem often occurs when natural law theory is applied to dis-
junctive ends and means. Normally we would insist that means be com-
mensurate with the ends in view; that is to say, moral ends cannot be 
achieved through immoral means . Here natural law theory introduces 
an appropriate corrective to what might become too rigid a canon of 
action, the principle of proportionality. For example, normally pro-
viding medical support services for life is considered morally good. But 
when those support services are only sustaining a terminally ill life, 
wracked by pain and in which there is no hope for recovery, then 
there are morally appropriate proportional limits on how much sup-
port we must provide. We must note here that it is within this prin-
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ciple of proportionality that the Roman Catholic Church has discussed 
the difference between ordinary and extraordinary 19 medical ther-
apy,20 and also put forth the principle of double effect. 21 
These two presuppositions of the conservative position, namely the 
sanctity of life principle and the natural law theory, as far as they have 
been explicated here, this author can fully support. The third presup-
position, however, remains problematic. 
c. The wedge argument can be stated in two ways. First, using 
the Kantian principle of uniyersality, (i.e., in order for an act to be 
good, the principle of that act must be universally good for all. For 
example, truth telling, being a universally good principle, is morally 
acceptable, while lying, which can never be universally good, is moral-
ly unacceptable), this says that what is wrong for a society is wrong 
for an individual. 22 Or, second, using the description of Norman St. 
John Stevas: "Once a concession about the disposability of innocent 
life is made in one sphere it will inevitably spread to others." 23 The 
horrors of this fear are vividly described by Yale Kamisar : 
" Miss Voluntary Euthanasia is not likely to be going it alone for very long. 
Many of her admirers . . . would be neither surprised nor distressed to see her 
joined by Miss Euthanitize the Congenital Idiots and Miss Euthanitize the 
Permanently Insane and Miss Euthanatize the Senile Dementia. And these 
lasses - whether or not they themselves constitu te a 'parade of horrors' - cer-
tainly make excellent majorettes for such a parade." 24 
The argument is the familiar "domino theory" that warns that once 
you admit one, it is only a matter of time before others are included. 
Or, "give an inch and they'll take a mile ." Or, once the "edge of the 
wedge" finds its way in, the whole wedge follows. The argument is 
also called "the slippery slope," i.e., once you begin to slide, you will 
eventually end up at the moral bottom. 
We must note here that the "wedge argument" has been the most 
powerful deterrent argument against any policy of euthanasia. 25 But 
it is problematic because of its own inner assumptions, which are : 
a . To make an exception to a rule would destroy the rule. To recog-
nize euthanasia as morally acceptable in one case would make arbi-
trary any attempt to prohibit it for other cases. 
b. The assumption that the worst must happen. To recognize eutha-
nasia as morally acceptable in one case would naturally lead to out-
rageous abuses, terminating the lives of anyone, and perhaps everyone, 
who did not meet the minimum criteria for humanhood. 
c. That humans are incapable of discriminating between cases that 
might be considered for euthanasia because of all of the uncertainties 
involved. 
All of these underlying assumptions for the "wedge argument" are 
problematic, indeed. First, it is not at all clear that exceptions to rules 
destroy the rules. Second, there is no rational basis for asserting that 
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the worst must happen. And, finally, to suggest that human beings 
cannot discriminate between cases raises a serious and, I believe, un-
founded attack upon man's conceptual powers . 
2. The liberal position, on the other hand, is based upon certain 
assumptions about what meaningful human life is and, at least accord-
ing to Joseph Fletcher, a "situational" understanding of how love can 
best be served, given a situation in which all the alternatives may be 
less than desirable. 26 This position too has problems. Indeed, the fears 
of abuse are much clearer here. The guidelines of this position are 
supplied by Fletcher himself in his presuppositions of "Situation 
Ethics." They are, 
a. Against the "sanctity of' life principle" he places pragmatism, 
which admits no absolutes of any kind, and relativizes every human 
value to its utility, its workability, and satisfactory consequences. 
Accordingly, human life is definable by qualitative measurements. 
Criteria can be established to determine the relative value of life so 
that life with little or no relative value is expendable. 27 
b. Against the natural law theory, Fletcher places personalism, 
which "rejects the vitalism and naturalistic determinism of natural law 
and replaces these values with personal values of human dignity, self-
possession and freedom of choice." 28 Theoretically, then, individuals 
who cannot appropriately appreciate and express these meaningful 
human values do not qualify as persons, and therefore, have little or 
no claim to the right to life .29 
c. In contrast to the "wedge argument" Fletcher believes that rela-
tivism can help identify how love can best be served; i.e., all moral 
norms are subject to the requirements of love. If love permits, or 
better, requires euthanasia, so be it.30 
In fairness, we must add that Fletcher believes he is developing a 
truly moral approach toward a policy of euthanasia. He calls for moral 
responsibility in making these heavy decisions. But he believes that 
"even the most revered principles can be thrown aside if they conflict 
in any concrete case with love. "31 
Pragmatism, personalism and relativism add up to a totally sub-
jective ethic without any necessary guarantee that any of our medical, 
or even pastoral, decisions will be consistent and rationally under-
stood . Here the temptations to abuse become legitimated in the fuzzi-
ness of our moral criteria. The "parade of horrors" that Kamisar 
envisioned, might too easily become a reality. 
C. A Synthetic Possibility For A Soft Paradigm 
As an ethicist with a particular theological heritage, my own posi-
tion with regard to the development of a policy of euthanasia is cen-
tered within what I accept as the foundational assumptions of pastoral 
care . Let me just briefly list these: 
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1. That we have an underlying sense of Christian values; 
2. That we are dedicated persons in our professions; dedicated to the care of 
souls as well as the care of bodies; 
3. That we h ave a sense of ministry and mission in our work; 
4. That we are competent in our work; that we are concerned about continu-
ously examining our own lives, our own values and how we do or do not 
communicate these values to others; 
5. That we are essentially fulfilled persons; that we enjoy the challenges that 
life provides and are not always chafing at the bit; 
6. That we are growth oriented; that we h ave a thirst for knowledge, both in 
our medical or pastoral specialities as well as in our quest for greater human-
istic insights into life. 
There is often a false fear among many people that says somehow 
that when we get into the thicket of decision-making in difficult cases, 
we are not going to be able to decide what is the best course of action 
to suggest or take. Even those who profess a sound religious faith, are 
often dismayed at their inability to reach decisions regarding care for 
terminally ill persons, whether they be children, adults, or the elderly. 
I am certainly not going to suggest that such decision-making can be 
simple or easy. The more difficult the case, the more difficult the 
decision. What I am going to suggest, however, is that our difficulty 
might be due to a false separation of human values regarding life and 
death. Indeed, I would suppose that if we examine ourselves, we 
would find that most of us only have values of life and have not 
thought very much about values of death, whether it be our own 
death or someone else's . 
As medical and para-medical professionals, we have a unique rela-
tionship to people in need. We have an opportunity to reach out to 
them in their need with all of the power of both our medicines and 
our own personal commitments. Euthanasia may very well be a diffi-
cult testing ground for our sense of values. But, if our values are 
important, then they should stand up to the most difficult of chal-
lenges . To ignore or deny the challenge is not to arrive at a satisfactory 
answer. 
I am going to insist that under no circumstance ought euthanasia be 
considered as an alternative to care. We have no moral ground on 
which to stand whatever, if we euthanize to avoid care. The mandate 
of the medical profession is to provide care.3 2 All other values rank 
below this primary obligation. The mandates to promote life and re-
lieve suffering can only be properly understood within the context of 
human care . To prolong life or to alleviate pain outside this context 
becomes an abuse of the medical privilege. 
Likewise, under this rubric of care, specific therapies become mean-
ingful activities. And under the rubric of care these medical therapies 
may have limited ranges of effectiveness. It is under this rubric of care 
that we can morally discontinue life-sustaining therapies because they 
are non-restorative and inefficacious. 
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What I am suggesting here is that the continuation of biological life 
is not the ultimate end value. We must not sacrifice life as long as 
there is reasonable hope and we certainly must not sacrifice hope 
when there is reasonable life. But both ·hope and life have reasonable 
limits which the rubric of care recognizes. Now, some specifics. 
1. My conservative nature requires that I cling fast to the sanctity of 
life principle; 33 that life is a sacred gift, given to us in trust by a loving 
God. But, I must also recognize that this gift, and the sacredness 
which accompanies it, also have limits; i.e., there comes a point in 
time when the gift is withdrawn and with that action the sacredness 
diminishes. 
If we regard life as a gift from God, we must recognize that He gives 
it to us in trust that we will use it appropriately to our understanding 
of His love. In recognizing that life and its sacredness have limits, we 
are recognizing the trustfulness with which the gift of life is given. 
This, of course, has biblical precedence. In the Scriptures, both per-
sons and places can have sacredness. And this special status can be 
lost, not only because of sin and defilement, but also because of the 
presence of God being withdrawn. 
For me, this biblical distinction applies to life and death. The Spirit 
of God is given to create life; it is also withdrawn as life loses its 
vitality, its entelechy, as manifested in irreversible coma, a flat (or 
essentially flat) electroencephalogram, or being in a "persistent vegeta-
tive state." Charles Curran makes a distinction between the "process 
of living" and the "process of dying." The point at which the "process 
of dying" overtakes the "process of living" is when life-preserving 
therapies can be discontinued because they are inefficacious. 34 For 
me, this is the withdrawal of that God-given sacredness which the gift 
possesses. My conservative nature requires me, therefore, to reject the 
need to prolong life as long as technically possible providing that 
certain base line criteria are established, e.g., the Harvard "brain 
death "35 or irreversible coma. 
2. My more moderate nature forces me to recognize that under the 
rubric of care excruciating and intractable pain is also destructive to 
the sanctity of life. Here pain moves beyond the therapeutic bounds 
of "purifying the soul" and is diminutive to the sacredness of that life. 
Under the rubric of care our mandate is to relieve pain. If we can 
decrease pain, even with high dosages, without depressing any physical 
and conceptual powers, we must do it. But if we cannot, then our first 
obligation is to relieve pain. 
Now, what I am suggesting might not be so different from what is, 
in fact, being done today in every hospital. With perhaps one excep-
tion. If this be passive euthanasia, let us recognize it as such and see it 
as one of our legitimate values of life within the rubric of care. We 
may wish to call it "terminal therapy" rather than euthanasia, but we 
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must recognize that it is a different kind of therapy than chemo- or 
excisional therapy, which aim primarily at cure or remisison. This is 
"terminal care therapy" and we should have no qualms about admit-
ting it, to each other, to the family, and even to the patient, if this is 
still possible. 
Daniel Maguire, in a 1974 essay published in the Humanist, recog-
nizes that given a particular patient, we may all agree that the most 
merciful thing would be death, while at the same time realizing that 
this process of dying is not the most merciful. 36 We must somehow 
make it clear to both patients and the public that our purpose is to 
provide care, whether it be health-care to those who can be restored to 
health, or terminal-care to those who cannot. The reality of death 
must be recognized, otherwise it will continue to be the dragon of fear 
that it is for many people today . We must realize that people do not 
fear death as much as they fear the process of dying. If we can assure 
our patients of our commitment to care, they will be less fearful of 
their own dying and more capable of dealing with their other anxieties. 
3. We must be very clear in our discussion of euthanasia as having a 
legitimate place in the medical mandate of care that we not be mis-
understood. We must neither see euthanasia as an alternative to care 
nor suggest it for individuals who are not terminally ill, in intractable 
pain or irretrievably comatose. 37 Here is the limit of my "soft" para-
digm. We cannot morally extend it to persons not in a life-threatening 
terminal conditions. A distinction supplied by Paul Ramsey is impor-
tant; a distinction between exceptions to a rule and exemptions from 
a rule. 
Life-Sustaining Therapies 
The rule would be to provide life-sustaining therapies of care to all. 
The exception to this rule would be, as already described, persons 
terminally ill and irretrievably comatose or in intractable pain. Exemp-
tions from even the consideration of euthanasia would be persons not 
in the terminal stages of dying, or to use the terms of Kamisar, the 
"congenital idiots ... the permanently insane ... the senile demen-
tia." These may represent those in society who are not as pleasant to 
look at, or relate to, but they are not, and never ought to be, the 
candidates for social extermination. 
It is important to note here that the present state of American case 
law makes this point explicitly clear. Normally law exists to protect 
innocent life,38 i.e., life that cannot protect itself.39 An example of 
this would be the ruling of Judge Muir at the Superior Court level in 
New Jersey that Karen Quinlan could not be removed from her life-
sustaining respirator. 40 However, the New Jersey State Supreme 
Court, in reversing Judge Muir has provided an appropriate corrective 
to the belief that the law always protects life to the fullest extent, 
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regardless of how terminally debilitated that life might actually be. 
The court ruled that: 
"We think that the State ' s interest contra weakens and the individual 's right to 
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. 
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the 
State interest. "4 1 
This is an extremely important legal step in morally recognizing 
that life has limits beyond which it ought not to be sustained. But the 
limits must be reached; and we cannot arbitrarily decide those limits. 
They are, as the court specified, to be determined medically, not 
socially. 
If this guideline is followed, the "wedge argument" is countered. 
Human beings are capable of discriminating between cases and can 
appropriately decide when a life is beyond hope and beyond our 
ability to save. Yes, of course, there will be difficult cases, and cases 
which are not immediately clear. In these instances we must decide 
in favor of sustaining life. But, when the evidence is irrefutable, we 
must be able to express death as a positive value of life. 
4. The only remaining question I wish to explore is the question of 
"who" should decide. Again the recent New Jersey Supreme Court 
Decision in the Case of Karen Quinlan is significant. Earlier, Judge 
Muir, in refusing to grant permission to remove her from the respira-
tor, ruled that the decision was purely a medical decision. 42 The 
family could make their request known, but the doctor must make the 
ultimate decision. 
The Supreme Court ruling reversed Judge Muir and said that it was 
a decision which the family must make. This was significant in that 
it gave Karen back to her parents for this final decision about her care. 
This is not to say that the doctor couldn't have made this decision 
wisely, but rather that values were at stake here that clearly went 
beyond medicine. 
Ideally, of course, it would be valuable to know Karen's wishes. 44 
Indeed, the patient's own wishes must be sought, if this is possible. 
But when this cannot ever be acquired, the proper locus for the deci-
sion is the family. My own addition to this would be to require that 
the attending physician say "when" this would be medically appropri-
ate, for he has much greater training and experience in recognizing 
when a person is in the moribund state. 
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